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Cyberwar and Unmanned Aerial
Vehicles: Using New
Technologies, from Espionage to
Action
Jessica A. Feil ∗
Every country on the planet is constantly on the lookout
for new strategies that will protect national security. The quest
for new tools is as old as warfare itself. Hundreds of years ago,
cannons were the height of technological development. Then
improved guns, tanks, ships, and airplanes carrying missiles.
Now the tools of national security seem to come straight from
science fiction. American military and civilian national security
agencies are frontrunners in developing cybertools that will help
keep soldiers and operatives safe and provide a tactical
advantage. These cyberweapons have been in development for
decades. Some policymakers and academics call for new
regulation or even prohibition of cyberweapons, both
domestically and internationally. Such regulation would be
short-sighted and reactionary. Cyberweapons offer significant
range of utility. Properly written computer code ensures targets
and goals are met accurately. New technologies offer precision
unknown in previous weaponry. Cyberweapons are not the only
new technology generating concern. Unmanned aerial vehicles
are similarly critiqued. The American government has provided
more expansive legal justifications for drone campaigns abroad.
The public information available about drone campaigns sheds
light on how cyberweapons will fit into the twenty-first century
national security universe.
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“But the fact of the matter is that cyber war is like Carl
Sandburg’s fog. It comes in on little cat feet, and it’s hardly noticed.
That’s its greatest potential.” 1
– John Arquilla

I.

Introduction

In 2010, the computer worm Stuxnet entered geopolitics by
striking Iranian nuclear facilities. 2 Stuxnet caused critical uranium
enrichment centrifuges to spin too quickly and break, all while
reporting no errors to the monitoring system. 3 While this alone did
not stop the Iranian nuclear weapon development program, it set it
back at least a few months. 4 A year later, Stuxnet spawned Duqu, 5 a

1.

Interview with John Arquilla, Associate Professor, Naval Postgraduate
School, PBS (Mar. 4, 2003), http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/
shows/cyberwar/interviews/arquilla.html. Arquilla is a professor at the
Naval Postgraduate School. Arquilla has been at the forefront of
cyberwar operations, including introducing such tactics in the First Gulf
War, Kosovo, and Afghanistan. Id.

2.

William J. Broad, John Markoff & David E. Sanger, Israeli Tests Called
Crucial in Iran Nuclear Setback, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 16, 2011, at A1.

3.

Id.

4.

Joby Warrick, Iran’s Nuclear Program Suffering New Setbacks
Diplomats and Experts Say, WASH. POST (Oct. 17, 2011), http://
www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/irans-nuclear-pro
gram-suffering-new-setbacks-diplomats-and-experts-say/2011/10/17/g
IQAByndsL_story.html.

5.

Kim Zetter, Son of Stuxnet Found in the Wild on Systems in Europe,
WIRED MAG. (Oct. 18, 2011), available at http://www.wired.com/thr
eatlevel/2011/10/son-of-stuxnet-in-the-wild/.
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Trojan 6 bearing the same hallmarks of the Stuxnet code. 7 The United
States and Israel eventually admitted to developing and launching
Stuxnet. 8 In 2012, a computer security company identified Flame,
which the United States and Israel also developed and launched prior
to Stuxnet. 9 Flame infiltrated computers, spying on computer files
and user actions, and laid the foundation for the later Stuxnet
attack. 10 Two more computer viruses, Mahdi and Gauss, are currently
spying on computers throughout the Middle East, including Iran. 11
A few years earlier, in 2008, a distributed denial of service attack
(DDoS) struck and incapacitated the government websites of
Georgia. 12 The DDoS attack preceded Russia’s armed invasion of
Georgia. 13 Without government websites, communication was
impossible, providing Russia a significant tactical advantage.14 A year
earlier, a DDoS attack, again originating in Russia, crippled the
internet infrastructure of Estonia. 15 Estonia has a 97% high-speed
internet penetration rate, so a disruption of access to web-based

6.

A Trojan is a program that steals data from the computers it infects
and sends the data back to its originator. Jaikumar Vijaya, FAQ: What
is the Big Deal About Duqu?, COMPUTERWORLD (Nov. 15, 2011),
available at http://www.computerworld.com/s/article/9221817/FAQ_
What_s_the_big_deal_about_Duqu_.

7.

Zetter, supra note 5.

8.

Broad, Markoff & Sanger, supra note 2.

9.

Ellen Nakashima, Greg Miller & Julie Tate, U.S., Israel Developed
Flame Computer Virus to Slow Iranian Nuclear Efforts, Officials Say,
WASH. POST June 19, 2012, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wor
ld/national-security/us-israel-developed-computer-virus-to-slow-iraniannuclear-efforts-officials-say/2012/06/19/gJQA6xBPoV_story_1.html.

10.

Id.

11.

Kim Zetter, Mahdi, the Messiah, Found Infecting Systems in Iran,
Israel, WIRED MAG. (July 17, 2012), http://www.wired.com/threatlev
el/2012/07/mahdi/; Jim Finkle, Virus Found in Mideast Can Spy on
Bank Transactions, REUTERS (Aug. 10, 2012), http://in.reuters.com/
article/2012/08/09/cybersecurity-gauss-idINL2E8J92YD20120809.

12.

John Markoff, Before the Gunfire, Cyberattacks, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 12,
2008, at A1.

13.

Id.

14.

Id.

15.

Joshua Davis, Hackers Take Down the Most Wired Country in Europe,
WIRED MAG. (Aug. 21, 2007), http://www.wired.com/politics/security
/magazine/15-09/ff_estonia?currentPage=all (stating that the impact of
attacks was felt by “[a]ll major commercial banks, telcos, media outlets,
and name servers . . . .”).
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services was disastrous.16 In both cases, the Russian government
denied responsibility.17
These attacks are just some of the examples of the more
successful and notorious cyber campaigns. There are countless
cyberattacks around the globe everyday;18 the most sophisticated
computer networks in the world are vulnerable. The U.S. Department
of Defense (DoD) fends off thousands of cyberattacks on a daily
basis.19 Despite the frequency of cyberattacks, there is no consensus as
to when a cyberattack becomes cyberwar.20 Cyberwar is at the
forefront of national security, making the need for a governing legal
framework more urgent than ever.21
16.

Id. Estonia has one of the highest internet penetration rates in the world
and extremely heavy reliance on this infrastructure. The entire
government internet presence was offline, online banking and ATMs
failed, newspapers websites were disconnected. There was virtually no
means of conducting regular business. Id.

17.

Kim Hart, Longtime Battle Lines Are Recast in Russia and Georgia’s
Cyberwar, WASH. POST Aug. 14, 2008, http://www.washington
post.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/08/13/AR2008081303623_pf.
html; A Cyber-Riot, THE ECONOMIST, May 12, 2007, at 42. Many believe
these attacks emerged from civilian pro-Russian movements with
implicit government support. Id.

18.

See Nathan Hodges, Pentagon Networks Targeted by “Hundreds of
Thousands” of Probes (Whatever that Means), WIRED MAG. (Apr. 15,
2010), http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2010/04/pentagon-networkstargeted-by-hundreds-of-thousands-of-probes/ (for example, the United
States is subject to thousands of small probe attacks everyday).

19.

Id. Not all of these attacks are malicious or successful. though many are
precursors or information gathering missions for larger attacks and need
to be caught and managed. Id.; see also Ellen Nakashima, After
Cyberattack on Lockheed Martin, Defense Department Sees “No
Adverse Effect”, WASH. POST, May 29, 2011, http://www.washington
post.com/world/national-security/after-cyberattack-on-lockheed-martindefense-department-sees-no-adverseeffect/2011/05/29/AGILYOEH_story.html
(demonstrating
major
internet and technology companies have all suffered cyber attacks,
including Google, Citigroup, and others, lest one think that the
technologically-savvy private world fares any better).

20.

Cf. Rosa Ehrenreich Brooks, War Everywhere: Rights, National Security
Law, and the Law of Armed Conflict in the Age of Terror, 153 U. PA. L.
REV. 675, 702–03 (2004) (noting the difficulty in developing
international consensus regarding management of new methods of
warfare).

21.

See, e.g., Phillip A. Johnson, Is It Time for a Treaty on Information
Warfare, 76 INT’L L. STUD. 429, 429–40 (discussing the many state calls
for an agreement on information warfare, but that experts think such
measures are premature); Yoram Dinstein, Computer Network Attacks
and Self-Defense, 76 INT’L L. STUD. 99, 114 (1999) (“The novelty of a
weapon—any weapon—always baffles statesmen and lawyers, many of
whom are perplexed by technological innovations.”).
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The newly developing legal framework for unmanned aerial
vehicles (UAVs) can and should guide a framework for cyberwar.
Despite vociferous criticism, 22 UAVs are fast becoming a fixture in the
U.S. national security system. 23 The Obama Administration has gone
to great lengths to justify the use of UAVs under domestic and
international law. 24 The United States’ legal framework for UAVs
should guide the development of the legal framework for cyberwar.
Part II of this Note details the U.S. military’s and national
security agencies’ development and adoption of drones and
cyberweapons. A foundation in the myriad uses and development of
these tools is helpful to understand the nuances of the relevant legal
regimes. This section also provides a brief foundation in the different
legal obligations between jus in bello and jus ad bellum scenarios. Part
III establishes the legality of UAV espionage and why cyber espionage
is similarly acceptable. Part IV finds the use of these new tools in
military armed attack is acceptable, as long as the armed attack is
otherwise lawful. Part V explores the area “in between” espionage and
force. It evaluates the legal justifications for the use of UAVs in
covert operations and extends this legal framework to cyberwar. In
addition, it considers how a state might use cyberwar as a tool of
coercion. Finally, Part VI concludes that cyberwar, like UAVs, is and
should be part of the current military and clandestine playbook.
There are some limitations worth mentioning. The information for
this Note is limited to public sources. Further, the debate surrounding
the legality of international UAV missions is far from settled. 25 In

22.

Kenneth Anderson, Efficiency in Bello and ad Bellum: Targeted Killing
Through Drone Warfare 1 (Sept. 23, 2011), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1812124 (“The criticisms [of drones] range
widely in their complaints. They include claims that . . . drone warfare
‘de-humanizes’ warfare and creates a ‘Playstation’ mentality towards
killing; targeting decisions lack transparency and legal standards,
particularly with regard to strikes undertaken by the CIA.”).

23.

See Predators Drones and Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs), N.Y.
TIMES (last updated Sept. 26, 2012), http://topics.nytimes.com/top/
reference/timestopics/subjects/u/unmanned_aerial_vehicles/index.html
(“[A]erial drones are transforming the way America fights and thinks
about wars.”).

24.

See id. (summarizing the various policy statements and speeches Obama
Administration officials have made asserting the legality of the UAV
program).

25.

See, e.g., Sikander Ahmend Shah, War on Terrorism: Self-Defense,
Operation Enduring Freedom, and the Legality of U.S. Drone Attacks in
Pakistan, 9 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 77, 89 (2010) (for a very
critical view of the legality of the current UAV program and arguing
that as used in Pakistan, the United States cannot claim the UAV
strikes are for self-defense); Richard Rosen, Drones and the U.S. Courts,
37 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 5280, 5281 (2011) (noting the significant

517

CaseWestern Reserve Journal of International Law·Vol. 45·2012
Cyberwar and Unmanned Aerial Vehicles

addition, the current use of UAVs is predominately against non-state
actors. 26 In contrast, cyberwar is applicable and has been applied
against both states and non-state actors. 27 Finally, this Note focuses
solely on cyberwar and does not cover issues of cybercrime or
cyberterrorism.

II. Background
Counterterrorism and national security expert and former White
House adviser Richard Clarke defines cyberwar as “actions by a
nation-state to penetrate another nation’s computers or networks for
the purposes of causing damage or disruption.” 28 Clarke’s definition
implies cyberwar can target either computer networks or traditional
infrastructure targets reached via computer networks. Although
cyberwar still lacks a single, agreed-upon definition, 29 Clarke’s
definition is representative and a useful starting point for the
development of a legal framework for cyberwar.
An understanding of the adoption of cyberwar and UAV
technologies by the United States is informative to the applicable
legal framework. The use of UAVs and cyberwar should be divided in
two ways. First, these tools are subject to different laws depending on
whether the state is engaged in active conflict or not. Second, these
tools can be regulated based on the intended use, whether for
surveillance, force, or interference tactics.
A.

The Explosion of Unmanned Technologies at the Pentagon

The first tests of unmanned vehicles occurred during World War
I 30 and UAVs emerged as reconnaissance tools during the Vietnam
War. 31 The first UAVs used as weapons were guided bombs, which
debate over the lawfulness of the UAV program under international law
and analyzing possible judicial remedies if the program is unlawful).
26.

See Chris Downes, ‘Targeted Killings’ in an Age of Terror: The Legality
of the Yemen Strike, 9 J. CONFLICT & SECURITY L. 277, 278 (considering
the use of UAVs in the campaign against terrorism).

27.

See James A. Lewis, Thresholds for Cyberwar 3–4 (Ctr. for Strategic
Int’l Stud. Rep., 2010) (noting that there have been cyber campaigns
against non-state actors, but this strategy is mostly employed against
states or corporations where there is likely to be more significant
impact).

28.

RICHARD CLARKE & ROBERT KNAKE, CYBER WAR 6 (2010).

29.

Jeffrey Carr, What Is Cyberwar?, SLATE.COM (Aug. 12, 2011),
http://www.slate.com/articles/technology/future_tense/2011/08/what_
is_cyberwar.html.

30.

JEREMIAH GERTLER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42136, U.S. UNMANNED
AERIAL SYSTEMS 1 (2012).

31.

Id. at 4.
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gave way to larger UAVs that deliver missiles to targets. 32 In the first
Persian Gulf War, the U.S. military used a few unmanned tanks and
a single UAV. 33 Since then, technology has developed rapidly and
UAVs have come to the forefront of military strategy. 34 Today the
military has over 7,000 UAVs—totaling one third of the air fleet—and
has requested $5 billion for further support of the UAV program from
Congress. 35 The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) does not disclose
how many UAVs are in its arsenal. 36
UAVs are a growing industry because of the relative low cost in
both their development and operation. 37 UAVs also reduce casualties
among American forces and collateral damage because of their greater
accuracy and precision. 38 The military is exploring other uses for
UAVs, such as refueling, air combat, search and rescue, and
resupply. 39 The current UAV fleet features vehicles that “range from
the size of an insect to that of a commercial airliner.” 40 Larger UAVs
are able to reach greater altitude, carry larger weapons, and have
better targeting precision. 41 UAVs are currently used for
reconnaissance, surveillance, and combined target acquisition and
precision strikes. 42 The features and uses of UAVs mirror that of
32.

Id.

33.

P.W. Singer, Military Robots and the Law of War, THE NEW ATLANTIS,
Winter 2009, at 25, 28. Israel originally led the way in expansive
exploration of this technology beginning in the 1980s. Id.

34.

Ryan J. Vogel, Drone Warfare and the Law of Armed Conflict, 39
DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 101, 104–05 (2010) (noting the rapid rise of
drones in the U.S. military fleet in just a few years).

35.

Predator Drones and Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs), supra note 23.

36.

Elisabeth Bumiller, A Day Job Waiting for a Kill Shot in a World
Away, N.Y. TIMES, July 30, 2012, at A1 (noting that the CIA drone
program is classified).

37.

GERTLER, supra note 30, at 2.

38.

Executive Summary and Command Brief, 9 J. MIL. ETHICS 416, 418
(2010).

39.

GERTLER, supra note 30, at 5–6.

40.

Id. at Summary.

41.

See generally U.S. AIR FORCE, UNMANNED AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS FLIGHT
PLAN 2009-2047 (May 18, 2009), available at http://www.govexec.
com/pdfs/072309kp1.pdf (describing present and future developments in
small, medium, and large unmanned aircraft systems).

42.

GERTLER, supra note 30, at 4. However, in the most recent Department
of Defense Priority Statement released in January 2012, the words
“drone” and “unmanned aerial vehicle” do not appear anywhere. DEP’T
OF DEFENSE, SUSTAINING U.S. GLOBAL LEADERSHIP: PRIORITIES FOR 21ST
CENTURY DEFENSE (2012), available at http://www.defense.gov/news
/Defense_Strategic_Guidance.pdf. This is despite the obvious growing
reliance on these tools in the war on terror, specifically in Pakistan.
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cyberweapons; these parallels elucidate how cyberwar fits in the
national security paradigm.
B.

The Growth of Information Operations and Computer Networks as
Defense Strategies

Control of information for political and strategic gain is not new.
Manipulation of computer networks offers a new way to achieve such
gain. 43 Individuals, companies, and governments can manipulate
computer networks to spread propaganda, collect classified
information, or shut down major infrastructure installations.44 There
are many methods of manipulation of computer networks. Information
operations (IO) is a modern concept of disrupting an adversary’s
information system while defending one’s own system. 45 IO becomes
information warfare (IW) when such actions are undertaken during
active hostilities. 46
IO and IW are expansive terms 47 and other very broad terms are
used in the same context or with the same meaning. For example,
Professor Matthew C. Waxman defines cyberattacks as “efforts to
Laurie R. Blank & Benajmin R. Farley, Characterizing US Operations
in Pakistan: Is the United States Engaged in an Armed Conflict, 34
FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 151, 151 (2011).
43.

See Michael N. Schmitt, Computer Network Attack and the Use of
Force in International Law: Thoughts on a Normative Framework, 37
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 885, 890 (1999) (“To the extent these
operations, whether occurring during times of peace or armed conflict,
intend interference with a country’s national defense by targeting
defense premises or resources, including human and natural resources,
they constitute ‘sabotage.’”).

44.

See id. (“Thus, Information operations would encompass, among an
array of other activities, virtually any nonconsensual actions intended to
discover, alter, destroy, disrupt, or transfer data stored in a computer,
manipulated by a computer, or transmitted through a computer
network.”).

45.

Id.

46.

See id. at 891 (“‘[I]nformation Warfare’ is often incorrectly used as a
synonym for ‘information operations.’ In fact, IW accurately refers to
those information operations conducted during times of crisis or conflict
intended to effect specific results against a particular opponent. Thus,
IW would not include information operations occurring during
peacetime.”).

47.

See id. at 890–92 (“[C]omputer network attack cuts across many
categories of offensive [information operations]—is [sic] intended result,
for instance, might be deception or psychological effect. It is a
technique, rather than a particular genre of objective. CNA operations
can be used to facilitate strategic, operational, and tactical ends.
Further, because physical destruction seldom results from CNA,
decision-makers find it a particular attractive option in situations short
of armed conflict.”).
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alter, disrupt, degrade or destroy computer systems or networks and
the information or programs on them.” 48 These are not limited to
state actions, as non-state actors could be involved with cyberattacks
as well. Professor Michael N. Schmitt notes computer network attacks
(CNA) could be stand-alone actions or used in conjunction with
traditional activities. 49 These broad terms reflect the extensive uses of
computers in defensive and offensive national strategies.
Relatively unsophisticated computer users are capable of CNA
that could be classified as a cyberattack. 50 DDoS attacks that disrupt
vital communication services, like those seen in Estonia and Georgia,
are not difficult to create. 51 Stuxnet, Duqu, and Flame are some of the
most sophisticated cyberattacks known, reflecting the significant
financial and intelligence resources the United States and Israel
provided. 52
IO and CNA offer a variety of uses, such as spying via keystroke
logging, data mining, or data interception. 53 While still just a specter,
the possibility of a virus that shuts down an electrical grid exists.54
Impersonation is one of the easiest ways to access online networks;
U.S. agents have participated in an online community of jihad

48.

Matthew C. Waxman, Cyber Attacks as “Force” Under UN Charter
Article 2(4), 87 INT’L L. STUD. 43, 43 (2011).

49.

Schmitt, supra note 43, at 890. For example, the United States
apparently considered using a computer network attack during the 2011
Libya intervention prior to the physical actions. Eric Schmitt & Thom
Shanker, U.S. Weighed Use of Cyberattacks to Weaken Libya,
N.Y.TIMES, Oct. 18, 2011, at A1.

50.

See Roger W. Barnett, A Different Kettle of Fish: Computer Network
Attacks, 76 INT’L L. STUD. 21, 22 (1999) (“The entry costs to conduct a
strategic information attack are insignificant—an inexpensive computer,
some easily obtainable software, and a simple connection to the
Internet. In theory, anyone just about anywhere can gain access and
mount an information attack that might bring about devastating
results.”).

51.

Davis, supra note 15.

52.

Jim Finkle, Virus Found in Mideast Can Spy on Bank Transactions,
REUTERS (Aug. 10, 2012), http://in.reuters.com/article/2012/08/09/cy
bersecurity-gauss-idINL2E8J92YD20120809.

53.

See, e.g., CLARKE & KNAKE, supra note 28, at 92 (discussing the
possibility of logic bombs, a major concern at American national
security agencies, which act as an “eraser” on a computer, destroying all
information rendering the computer a “useless hunk of metal” and could
cause catastrophic damage including destroyed electrical grids or loss of
aircraft control systems).

54.

Id.
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activists in order to gather information. 55 Although this operation was
mostly passive, this operation is a form of IO.
The United States recognizes cyberspace as part of national
defense. U.S. Cyber Command opened in 2010, as the authority on
cyber defense and operations. 56 DoD initially took a defensive
approach to cyberspace, focusing on securing American installations
from outside attack. 57 This defensive tone has shifted to a more
offensive tone. In 2011, the Pentagon reported to Congress that
cyberweapons are a viable part of military action in a theater of
active conflict. 58 According to this report, “DoD will ensure that the
U.S. military continues to have all necessary capabilities in cyberspace
to defend the United States and its interests . . . .” 59 Without
providing details on specific capabilities, the report states:
The Department [of Defense] has the capability to conduct
offensive operations in cyberspace to defend our Nation, Allies and
interests. If directed by the President, DoD will conduct offensive
cyber operations in a manner consistent with the policy principles and
legal regimes that the Department follows for kinetic capabilities,
including the law of armed conflict. 60
The military and government’s interest in offensive capabilities of
cyberspace grows as the tools and capabilities of cyberspace and
computer networks expand. With this growing arsenal, understanding
the legal consequences becomes more critical.
55.

See EVGENY MOROZOV, THE NET DELUSION 226–27 (2011); see also
CATHERINE THEOHARY & JOHN ROLLINS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV.,
R41674, TERRORIST USE OF THE INTERNET: INFORMATION OPERATIONS IN
CYBERSPACE 6–7 (2011) (discussing national security agencies’ efforts to
use the internet to monitor and possibly disrupt extremists); Ellen
Nakashima, Dismantling of Saudi-CIA Illustrates Need for Clearer
Cyberwar Policies, WASH. POST, Mar. 19, 2010, http://www.washingto
npost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/03/18/AR2010031805464.html
(discussing the United States’ use of a cyberattack to shut down a
website the CIA and Kingdom of Saudi Arabia created to attract
extremists for intelligence gathering).

56.

U.S. Cyber Command, U.S. STRATEGIC COMMAND, http://www.strat
com.mil/factsheets/cyber_command/ (last updated Dec. 2011).

57.

See, e.g., U.S.-COMPUTER EMERGENCY READINESS TEAM, DEP’T OF
HOMELAND SECURITY, NATIONAL STRATEGY TO SECURE CYBERSPACE
(2003) (outlining steps to secure U.S. infrastructure against cyberattack,
but not suggesting offensive options in cyberspace).

58.

Ellen Nakashima, Pentagon Cyber Offense Part of U.S. Strategy, WASH.
POST, Nov. 15, 2011, http://www.washingtonpost.com/pentagon-cyberoffense-part-of-us-strategy/2011/11/15/gIQArEAlPN_story.html.

59.

DEP’T OF DEFENSE, DEPARTMENT
REPORT 2 (2011).

60.

Id. at 5.
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C.

The Jus in Bello and Jus ad Bellum Distinction

The distinction between jus in bello and jus ad bellum is discussed
extensively in scholarly works. 61 These areas of law are central to any
justification for cyberwar in international law. The jus in bello (laws
of war) regulate actors during an active conflict. 62 Before initiating a
war, jus ad bellum (laws before war) rules apply. 63
Modern jus in bello emerged in the late nineteenth century and
led to the Hague Conventions and the Geneva Conventions. 64 The
Hague Conventions govern the tools of war by prohibiting certain
weapons. 65
In comparison, the Geneva Convention and its subsequent
protocols are the foundation for the law of war, 66 governing actors in
61.

See generally Steven R. Ratner, Jus ad Bellum and Jus in Bello After
September 11, 96 AM. J. INT’L L. 905 (2002) (providing overview of the
modern thinking on these areas of international law).

62.

Id. at 905–06.

63.

Id. at 905.

64.

Brooks, supra note 20, at 688–89 (discussing the development of the
Hague and Geneva Conventions).

65.

See, e.g., Hague Convention No. IV Respecting the Laws and Customs
of War on Land, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2277, T.S. 539 [hereinafter
Hague IV]; Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of
Certain Conventional Weapons Which May be Deemed to be
Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects, Oct. 10, 1980,
19 I.L.M. 1523 (prohibiting the use of weapons that might cause injury
by fragment but then be undetectable on x-ray, mines, booby-traps,
“other devices,” incendiary weapons, and blinding lasers); Convention
on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling and Transfer of AntiPersonnel Mines and on Their Destruction, Dec. 3, 1997, 36 I.L.M.
1507 (requiring all State Parties to not use, stockpile, or develop and to
destroy any existing anti-personnel mines); Convention on Cluster
Munitions, May 30, 2008, 38 I.L.M. 354 (banning cluster munitions).
The Geneva “branch” of law focuses on the actors, while the Hague
“branch” focuses on the weapons. YVES SANDOZ, CONVENTION OF 10
OCTOBER 1980 ON PROHIBITIONS OR RESTRICTIONS ON THE USE OF
CERTAIN CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS WHICH MAY BE DEEMED TO BE
EXCESSIVELY INJURIOUS OR TO HAVE INDISCRIMINATE EFFECT 1 (2010),
available at http://untreaty.un.org/cod/avl/pdf/ha/cprccc/cprccc_e.
pdf. In contrast, cyber tools—and drones—provide a greater range of
choices and utility than the prohibited weapons and in fact can be used
in a way that falls well short of force. See Waxman, supra note 48, at 47
(exploring when cyberattacks might be classified as force and providing
an overview of other scholarly thinking on the issue).

66.

James D. Fry, The UN Security Council and the Law of Armed
Conflict: Amity or Enmity?, 38 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 327, 330
(2006). Although the United Nations Charter made aggressive war
illegal, it did not outlaw a state of war per se, nor does not provide
guidance of proper behavior during war. Id.
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war. 67 The Geneva Conventions and Protocols require proper
treatment of the sick, wounded, prisoners of war, civilians, and those
no longer engaged in hostilities. 68 Together, these laws of armed
conflict ensure protection for civilians and innocents while allowing
states to pursue national security interests during conflict.
Under jus ad bellum, the UN Charter Article 2(4) outlaws the use
of force. 69 But there are two narrow exceptions: a state may use force
against another state when authorized by the UN Security Council or
in self-defense. 70 The UN Charter understands force through the
method, not the effect, of the action. 71 The prohibition on the use of
force has evolved as an international norm due to its centrality to the

67.

E.g., Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 27–28 (1942) (“[T]his Court has
recognized and applied the law of war as including that part of the law
of nations which prescribes, for the conduct of war, the status, rights
and duties of enemy nations as well as of enemy individuals.”).

68.

See generally Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition
of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949,
75 U.N.T.S. 31; Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the
Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed
Forces at Sea, Aug 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 85; Geneva Convention
Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 75
U.N.T.S. 135; Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian
Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 287; Protocol
Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating
to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol
I), adopted June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3; Protocol Additional to the
Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection
of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II), adopted
June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609.

69.

U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4 (“All Members shall refrain in their
international relations from the threat or use of force against the
territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any
other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.”).

70.

U.N. Charter art 51. (“Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the
inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack
occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security
Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace
and security.”).

71.

WALTER GARY SHARP, JR., CYBERSPACE AND THE USE OF FORCE 69
(1999) (clarifying that a state becomes a party to active hostilities when
there is a declaration of war, some sort of military occupation, or the
sate is “engaged in a use of force of a scope, duration, and intensity with
another state that reaches the level of an armed attack,” as defined
under the UN charter); see also Marie Jacobson, Modern Weaponry and
Warfare: The Application of Article 36 of Additional Protocol I by
Governments, 82 INT’L L. STUD. 183, 184 (2006) (referencing the ICRC
Commentary’s prohibition on means of warfare and certain methods of
warfare).
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UN Charter. 72 States support the prohibition on the use of force in
order to protect their own interests. 73 This principle still leaves open
the question: What is force? 74 New technology makes this question
even more difficult to answer. State actions must be determined to be
force amounting to armed attack before response force is authorized—
and many actions fall short of this threshold and are thus permitted
under international law.

III. Surveillance and Information Gathering
Intelligence gathering is vital to any state, during peacetime or
conflict. 75 The 1907 Hague Convention IV recognizes spies as a regular
part of active conflict. 76 Outside of the Hague Convention, the
international laws of war surrounding espionage largely concern the
treatment of spies when captured. 77 Yet international law does not
expressly prohibit or allow espionage during peacetime. 78 Domestic
espionage laws are a contradiction: “[m]ost domestic legal systems . . .
seek to prohibit intelligence gathering by foreign agents while
protecting the state’s own capacity to conduct such activities
abroad.” 79 Under domestic law, the United States may lawfully engage
72.

Sean D. Murphy, Protean Jus Ad Bellum, 27 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 22,
25 (2009) (“[S]tatic jus ad bellum maintains that a state may not use
armed force against another state unless it is defending against an
armed attack or authorized by the Security Council to do so . . . . [n]o
doubt there are several reasons why his particular norm as continued to
be viewed as static.”).

73.

See id. at 26 (noting the interests of a range of international actors in
preserving the prohibition, but discussing how powerful nations might
act in ways that appear to be force, but justifying it under the current
paradigm to prevent creating problematic precedent).

74.

Id. at 28.

75.

Lt. Col. Geoffrey B. Demarest, Espionage in International Law, 24
DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 321, 321 (1996) (finding that intelligence
activities are now a regular part of the modern state’s security
activities).

76.

Hague IV, supra note 65, art. 24. Article 24 explicitly states: “Ruses of
war and the employment of measures necessary for obtaining
information about the enemy and the country are considered
permissible.” Id.

77.

Demarest, supra note 75, at 335 (discussing when the classification of
spy is applicable).

78.

Id. at 321 (noting international law applicable to espionage in times of
peace is “virtually unstated”).

79.

Simon Chesterman, The Spy Who Came in from the Cold War:
Intelligence and International Law, 27 MICH. J. INT’L L. 1071, 1072
(2006).
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in espionage. 80 International law protects spies who are captured
whereas domestic laws prosecute foreign spies when captured. UAVs
and computer viruses offer an advantage in espionage because they do
not need humanitarian protection.
A.

Flying Spies

The United States uses UAVs for espionage. 81 The UAV known as
the Predator was frequently used for surveillance of Al-Qaeda
operatives, because of its significantly greater accuracy than
surveillance from typical fighter jets. 82 More than ten years ago, the
CIA was using UAVs to track Osama bin Laden. 83 Small UAVs are
also in development that are less detectable, less intrusive, and blend
into their surroundings by mimicking insects and birds. 84
A nation targeted by reconnaissance UAVs might claim the selfdefense doctrine and respond with force. During the Cold War, Russia
alleged that foreign planes in its airspace were spying, then classified
this as a use of force, and attacked the planes while claiming selfdefense. 85 The UN Security Council disagreed, finding the flights were
not a use of force even though the flights violated Russian
sovereignty. 86 Similar problems may arise when using UAVs for
reconnaissance. 87
80.

Commander Roger D. Scott, Territorially Intrusive Intelligence
Collection and International Law, 46 A.F. L. REV. 217, 218 (1999)
(“[T]he United States is under no legal obligation, domestic or
international, to refrain from engaging in espionage.”).

81.

See U.S. AIR FORCE, supra note 41, at 25–26, (The U.S. military
primarily uses three drones for surveillance missions—the Wasp III, the
RQ-11 Raven, and the MQ-1 Predator). Other drones have been used
for surveillance missions, but were phased out for cost reasons.
GERTLER, supra note 30, at 11.

82.

Jane Mayer, The Predators of War, THE NEW YORKER, Oct. 26, 2009,
http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2009/10/26/091026fa_fact_maye
r.

83.

Id. Although the success of such tracking is still up for debate. Some
intelligence agents believe that the supposed sightings of bin Laden were
not accurate. Id.

84.

Elisabeth Bumiller & Thom Shanker, War Evolves with Drones, Some
Tiny as Bugs, N.Y. TIMES, June 20, 2011, at A1.

85.

SHARP, supra note 71, at 126.

86.

S.C. Res. 135, U.N. Doc. S/RES/135 (May 27, 1960) (urging “all
Member Governments to . . . respect each other’s sovereignty”).

87.

See Kurt Larson & Zachary Malamud, The United States, Pakistan, the
Law of War and the Legality of the Drone Attacks, 10 J. INT’L BUS. & L.
1, 13 (2011) (discussing the use of drones in Pakistan based on
cooperative efforts between the nations and value of consent in UAV
operations).
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Pakistan has publicly claimed U.S. UAV missions in its airspace
violate Pakistani sovereignty, which might give rise to a right to act
in self-defense. 88 When a reconnaissance UAV crashed in Iran due to a
technological malfunction, Iran seized the opportunity to take the
aircraft for further study and leveraged the capture geopolitically. 89 In
either scenario, the United States risked Pakistan or Iran responding
to the surveillance with force. Yet, if the UAVs were attacked, the
only loss would be expensive equipment, not human life. 90
B.

Desk Jockey Spies

Like UAVs, reconnaissance via computer networks is also covert.
For example, a state can use a pre-installed “backdoor” to access the
computer network of an adversarial government. 91 This is the exact
sort of operation the United States ran as part of Olympic Games, the
United States-Israel coordinated effort to infiltrate and disrupt
uranium enrichment in Iran. The Flame virus infiltrated and spied on
computers in Iran for years, prior to the Stuxnet attack. The virus
was able to “activate computer microphones and cameras, log
keyboard strokes, take screen shots, extract geolocation data from
images, and send and receive commands and data through Bluetooth
wireless technology.” 92 The attack was designed to lay the framework
for later covert action.

88.

DAVID E. SANGER, CONFRONT AND CONCEAL 250 (2012).
However, the two states have some cooperation in this program.
But the United States cannot explain its [UAV] strategy. That
silence is part of the unspoken deal with Pakistan, which wants
to hide its episodic participation in the drone program because
of fear of what its cooperation with the United States would
look like to the Pakistani public. And if a strike goes bad and
civilians are killed, the Pakistani government can deny it ever
knew about it.
Id.

89.

Greg Jaffe & Thomas Erbdink, Iran Says it Downed U.S. Stealth Drone;
Pentagon Acknowledges Aircraft Downing, WASH. POST, Dec. 4, 2011, at
A21.

90.

See SANGER, supra note 88, at 148 (discussing the Obama
Administration’s decision to do nothing when the UAV crashed in Iran,
as this was the “safest course” for military personnel and civilian
Iranians). Had either nation responded by attacking the United States
on its territory, they would have violated the international principle of
proportionality.

91.

See CLARKE & KNAKE, supra note 28, at 59–60 (outlining the process
and uses of “backdoors” in computer network attacks).

92.

Nakashima, Miller & Tate, supra note 9.
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Another option is to use malicious code that then reroutes
information on a computer network to those who wish to see it.93
Another example is “IP spoofing,” when a hacker pretends to be a
legitimate website, so when users access the website they are
unknowingly rerouted to the hacker’s fake site. 94 The hacker then
gains access to information entered by the user. 95 When these actions
do not otherwise cause kinetic damage or degrade the computer
network in any way, they are more akin to surveillance flight than a
use of force. 96 In an active combat context, an order given by a
commanding officer to exploit a computer network in order to acquire
necessary information about a target or threat would be the same as
giving the order to a person. 97
Gathering information via long-range electronic signals,
geolocation, sensors, lasers and the other technologies is a
longstanding part of intelligence gathering. 98 With these tools states
can avoid sending people into dangerous situations just for
information gathering. 99 Because drones and computer attacks operate
without a person on board, these tools are safer for the spying state
and its operatives. 100
While UAVs allow a state to target an intruding aircraft,
computer network infiltration will be a much more elusive target.
Even if a state can identify the actor who launched the surveillance

93.

Herbert Lin, Offensive Cyber Operations and the Use of Force, 5 J.
NAT’L SECURITY L. & POL’Y 63, 65–68 (2011) (providing an overview of
cyber espionage, beginning with finding a network vulnerability through
exploiting the weakness to gather information or degrade the network).

94.

Farha Ali, IP Spoofing, 10 THE INTERNET PROTOCOL J. 1, 2 (2007),
available at http://www.cisco.com/web/about/ac123/ac147/archived_i
ssues/ipj_10-4/ipj_10-4.pdf.

95.

Id. at 3.

96.

Major Arie J. Schapp, Cyber Warfare Operations: Development and Use
Under International Law, 64 A.F. L. REV. 121, 139 (2009) (“These types
of actions [cyber espionage], provided they do not disrupt, deny,
degrade, manipulate, or destroy information resident in computers and
computer networks, or the computers and networks themselves, should
not be considered cyber warfare operations.”).

97.

Id. at 140 (establishing that espionage is a typical part of state activities
during conflict, regardless of the means employed to gather intelligence).

98.

THOMAS C. WINGFIELD, THE LAW OF INFORMATION CONFLICT: NATIONAL
SECURITY LAW IN CYBERSPACE 350–51 (2000).

99.

Chris Jenks, Law from Above: Unmanned Aerial Systems, Use of Force,
and the Law of Armed Conflict, 85 N.D. L. REV. 649, 653 (2009) (listing
the array of uses of UAVs, sans human operator, by the U.S. military).

100. Cf. id. (noting there is no person at risk if a UAV is captured; similarly,
a computer virus cannot be caputred).
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computer attack, it may take months or years to do so. 101 When one
state hacks into the computer system of another, it violates the target
state’s domestic laws. 102 However, because the use of aircraft for
reconnaissance is not force, the use of computer networks to infiltrate
another state should not be considered force. 103
States may resort to some self-defense measures more quickly if
subject to computer espionage. Because of the speed with which
computer espionage can escalate to computer attack, a targeted state
may rightfully resort to self-defense in order to protect state secrets or
infrastructure. 104 While a plane or UAV has to reach its target prearmed with a missile to inflict damage, an intentional change or
simple mistake in computer coding can completely change the effects
of the infiltration. 105 States may not be able to capture computer
spies, but they can defend against such incursions or surveillance. 106
C.

Cooperation Among States in Espionage Efforts

Similar to asking a state for permission to use airspace, a state
may ask for permission to use another state’s cyberspace, though
private corporations own the computer networks and systems that
make up cyberspace. 107 Terrorists use the internet to communicate
and organize attacks. 108 The details of these plans are not written in

101. See, e.g., Nakashima, Miller & Tate, supra note 9 (noting nations finally
identified Flame as the predecessor of Stuxnet, but only years after the
original attack was launched and years after Stuxnet was identified).
102. SHARP, supra note 71, at 127–28.
103. Id. at 127–29.
104. Id. at 129. Before responding in self-defense, a nation would need to
properly attribute the attack to another state actor, which is extremely
difficult in cyberspace. Horace B. Robertson, Jr., Self-Defense Against
Computer Network Attack, 76 INT’L L. STUD. 122, 138 (1999).
105. See SANGER, supra note 88, at 204–05 (describing the likely scenario in
which Stuxnet was released “into the wild” accidentally).
106. See generally Waxman, supra note 48, 50–51 (noting the right to selfdefense against cyber attacks, assuming the targeted nation can identify
the perpetrator of the attack).
107. George K. Walker, Neutrality and Information Warfare, 76 INT’L L.
STUD. 233, 235–37 (2002) (discussing the validity of attacking privately
owned communications lines during conflict). A neutral party is
obligated to deny belligerents access to the neutral territory or
resources. This can mean the neutral party has to actively mobilize to
prevent belligerent access. In cyberspace, this means a service provider
must use the technology available to it to prevent hackers, belligerent
governments, or cyber terrorists from manipulating a neutral computer
network. Id.
108. THEOHARY & ROLLINS, supra note 55, at 2.
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plain language for all to read. 109 A state can ask permission to monitor
the computer networks that host these websites to gain more reliable
information regarding the whereabouts of terrorists. By asking for
permission prior to such monitoring, the state respects sovereignty
and promotes good faith.
Information gathering is not illegal in most situations. What is
illegal is mistreatment of agents of states engaged in information
gathering. 110 Not all states can be trusted to observe these
international laws, 111 so the use of non-human tools like UAVs and
computer network infiltration afford a safer alternative to achieve a
legitimate objective.

IV. Cyberwar and UAV Missions Amounting to Force
Cyberwar and UAVs are valid tools to exert military force. As
long as the military force follows the applicable laws of war, then a
state may use these new technologies. 112 The “issues surrounding use,
targeting, and collateral damage are no different” with new
technology as compared to any other weapons system. 113 It has long
been the goal of states to find the most technologically advanced way
to conduct hostilities in order to protect itself. 114

109. Id.
110. See Chesterman, supra note 79, at 1078 (“From around the time of the
U.S. Civil War, traditional rules were supplemented by an unusual and
quite literal escape clause: if caught in the act of espionage, spies were
subject to grave punishment, but if they managed to return to their
armies before being captured, they were entitled treatment as prisoners
of war and were immune from penalties meted out to spies.”).
111. See id. (noting
punishment”).

caputured

spies

are

often

subject

to

“grave

112. See Kenneth Anderson, ‘Drones II’: Testimony Submitted to the U.S.
House of Representatives Committee on Oversight and Government
Reform, Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs 3
(American University WCL Research Paper No. 2011-26, 2011),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1619819 (“[T]he fundamental
question of drone warfare is not really the technological platform, but
instead where and who operates it.”).
113. Id.
114. David Bell, In Defense of Drones: A Historical Argument, THE NEW
REPUBLIC (Jan. 27, 2012), http://www.tnr.com/article/politics/100113
/obama-military-foreign-policy-technology-drones.
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In Conjunction with a Traditional Armed Attack

Today, UAVs are a major component of active conflicts in the
U.S. military. 115 UAVs were previously used in Afghanistan and are
now mostly used in Pakistan as part of the war on terror against AlQaeda and the Taliban. 116 Controversy over UAV strikes continues to
spark debate over the propriety of using force more than ten years
after the original Authorization for the Use of Military Force (AUMF)
in 2001. 117 Critics complain UAVs are not a legitimate means of
conducting battle, because the human actors avoid the realities of
war. 118 However, this characterization ignores the previous
developments in long-range weaponry 119 and the realities of UAV
operation. 120
First, given the accuracy of UAVs, they are safer for the user and
in line with the interests of international humanitarian law because
UAVs are one of the most precise weapons available. 121 There are a
115. Anderson, supra note 22, at 8 (noticing military commanders are often
“mystified” by the controversy over UAVs in active battle as these are
another tool, just like aerial bombings or long distance missiles).
116. Larson & Malamud, supra note 87, at 13. UAVs are also currently in
use in Yemen and Somalia against Al-Qaeda. Drones, Computers New
Weapons of US Shadow Wars, USA TODAY, June 12, 2012,
http://www.usatoday.com/news/military/story/2012-06-17/dronescomputers-weapons-us-wars/55645786/1.
117. See Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Congressional
Authorization and the War on Terrorism, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2047, 2052
(2005) (“The difficult issue is determining what Congress has implicitly
authorized [under the AUMF].”).
118. See Anderson, supra note 22, at 7 (“[T]argeted killing and drone warfare
need to be differentiated . . . [drones are] simply an alternative air
platform for doing what otherwise might be done with helicopters, fixed
wing aircraft, or ground attack in the course of conventional
counterinsurgency operations.”); Bumiller, supra note 36 (describing the
different responsibilities of a fighter jet pilot and a UAV pilot).
119. See Mark Clayton, The New Cyber Arms Race, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE
MONITOR (Mar. 7, 2011), http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Military/20
11/0307/The-new-cyber-arms-race.
120. See generally Bumiller, supra note 36 (noting the psychological strains
on UAV pilots).
121. See Anderson, supra note 22, at 8 (classifying drones as a legitimate tool
in bello). Air Force Retired Lt. Gen. David Deptula said “‘Statistically
over 95 percent of all the weapons released by the predator hit exactly
what they’re aimed for,’ . . . those that fall into the other 5 percent…are
either caused by ‘some mechanical malfunction or a last-minute
movement of the target location.’” Jackie Northam, Popularity of
Drones Takes Off for Many Countries, NPR (July 11, 2011),
http://www.npr.org/2011/07/11/137710942/popularity-of-drones-takesoff-for-many-countries.
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host of justifications for the continuing use of UAVs in Pakistan, such
as consent and self-defense. 122 So long as there exists a valid use of
force or claim of self-defense, drones fall within the arsenal of viable
military tools. 123
Second, UAV pilots have expressed offense at the characterization
of their work as a mere video game and describe the realities of their
work as more emotionally draining than flying fighter jets. 124 UAV
pilots follow their targets for weeks and “observe the habits of a
militant as he plays with his children, talks to his wife and visits his
neighbors. They then try to time their strike when, for example, his
family is out at the market.” 125 UAV pilots are more intimately
familiar with their targets than pilots of traditional jets. After
executing orders and firing on a target, the UAV pilot then has the
added stress of stepping out into the suburbs of his American home
and trying to lead a civilian life. 126 Although many decry the use of
UAVs, the tool itself, simply by virtue of being a new technology, is
not illegitimate.
Like UAVs, cyberwar should be regarded as a valid military
tool. 127 The use of cyberwar is simply another evolution of technology
on the battlefield. In active combat, a cyberattack can create kinetic
damage similar to or substantially the same as traditional modes of
force. Because such an attack creates kinetic damage, it falls under
the paradigm of the laws of war, which look to the action to
determine whether force was used, not the result. 128 The use of a
cyberattack amounting to force in conjunction with an otherwise
lawful traditional attack would be unlikely to raise any legal
questions. 129 For example, former General Counsel to the CIA and the
National Security Agency, Daniel B. Silver stated: “If, as may have
122. Larson & Malamud, supra note 87, at 13.
123. However, some of the debate stems from the split use of UAVs between
the military and the CIA. Id. at 12.
124. See Bumiller, supra note 36 (explaining the emotional challenges facing
UAV pilots).
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Although, some officials have warned it is easy to “fall in love with a
whiz-bang new technology, because it is easy to justify relying on it
more and more. And that’s when a tactical weapon can begin defining
your strategy.” SANGER, supra note 88, at 244 (internal quotation marks
omitted).
128. See Geneva Conventions
accompanying text.

and

Protocols,

supra

note

68

and

129. See Daniel B. Silver, Computer Network Attack as a Use of Force Under
Article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter, 76 INT’L L. STUD. 73, 79
(2002).
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been the case in the Kosava conflict [computer network attack] is
used in the context of military operation conducted by traditional
means that indubitably constitute force, the target State would have
little interest in raising a legal dispute on the sole issue of [computer
network attack].” 130 In that situation, Serbia’s only basis to claim this
attack was unlawful would be to claim the entire operation was
unlawful, not just the cyber component. 131
Military use of cyberwar, as part of a lawful, active combat
scenario still must conform to the rules of the battlefield. 132 The laws
of war will constrain the use of computer attacks. For example, the
principle of distinction, which dictates that care be taken to avoid
harming the civilian population, still applies and a computer attack
must be limited to legitimate military targets. 133 A state utilizing
computer attacks must also avoid collateral damage and take
necessary precautions to protect neutral parties and civilians. 134 In
addition, military actions must be necessary and conducted with a
level of force proportional to the mission at hand. 135 With observation
of the principles of jus in bello, “a computer network that is tailored
130. Id.
131. Id. A cyberattack was also on the table prior to invading Iraq in the
First Gulf War. Given that this intervention as a matter of armed force
was lawful, the potential use of cyberattack prior to invasion to protect
the incoming air strike would have been a permissible tactic. Ultimately
this strategy was not used because it was thought to be too risky at the
time, requiring a person to cross enemy lines to unleash the cyberattack,
instead of acting remotely. CLARKE & KNAKE, supra note 28, at 8–9.
132. Knut Dörmann, Applicability of the Additional Protocols to Computer
Networks Attacks 2 (2004), http://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other
/applicabilityofihltocna.pdf (“[T]he fact that a particular military
activity constituting a method of warfare is not specifically regulated,
does not mean that it can be used without restriction.”).
133. See generally Louise Doswald-Beck, Some Thoughts on Computer
Network Attack and the International Law of Armed Conflict, 76 INT’L
L. STUD. 163, 165–69 (2002) (discussing the development of the principle
of distinction in international law, including the prohibition on
indiscriminate attacks, and necessity of proper precautions and efforts to
avoid collateral damage regardless of the weapon being used).
134. See generally id. at 169–72 (discussing proper methods to avoid
collateral damage).
135. James H. Doyle, Jr. Computer Networks, Proportionality, and Military
Operations, 76 INT’L L. STUD. 147, 156 (2002). There is no requirement
that the defending nation only use force identical to that threatened. In
fact, they may use disproportionately more force than that threatened in
order to ensure an efficient and decisive victory. The proportionality is
measured against the goal to be achieved. So, if a computer network
attack is the best strategy to prevent a significant attack, it is
justifiable. Id.
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to produce limited physical consequences may prove to be an effective
non-lethal tool of warfare.” 136
B.

As a Precursor to Armed Attack

UAVs and cyberwar fit clearly into the military arsenal during
armed attack. If UAVs strike a nation, causing kinetic damage, there
has clearly been an armed attack triggering the targeted state’s right
to self-defense. It is more difficult to determine when cyberwar used
as outside of full-scale conflict becomes the flashpoint for a full-scale
conflict. 137
If a state uses a UAV to enter a sovereign state and drop a
missile without provocation or self-defense, such action is an armed
attack. 138 Military UAVs are identifiable and attributable. 139 Although
approximately fifty states are developing their own UAV fleets, it is
no secret that the United States is managing both the official military
and the covert CIA operations in Pakistan. 140 Even if UAV use
becomes more ubiquitous, if a UAV attack is launched, the targeted
nation will likely be able to identify the perpetrator and respond.
Cyberattacks on the other hand, are notoriously anonymous, often
making attribution difficult if not impossible. 141 Even assuming that
attribution is possible and completed quickly enough to justify action,
it is not always clear when a cyberattack constitutes use of force,
justifying self-defense. 142 The National Research Council promotes an

136. Id. at 157.
137. See Dörmann, supra note 132, at 2 (“The most difficult situation, as far
as applicability of [international humanitarian law] is concerned, would
be the one where the first, or the only ‘hostile’ acts are conducted by
CNA.”).
138. See Blank & Farley, supra note 42, at 153 (suggesting the current use of
UAVs may exceed the authorized use of force and therefore might not
justified be justified under international law).
139. See Northam, supra note 121 (noting the use of UAVs for a variety of
strategies is becoming “ubiquitous” around the world).
140. Id.
141. See Barnett, supra note 50, at 22 (“Now nameless, faceless actors can
potentially attain strategic objective; and the possibility exists of not
being able to identify the perpetrators and hold them accountable.”).
142. See Doyle, supra note 135, at 151. There is little public information
about U.S. government, or any government, attribution efforts regarding
cyberattacks by state actors. However, a comparison with the more
public efforts surrounding attribution in cyberterrorism is apt. For
example, the hacker group “Anonymous” has graced headlines recently,
for their significant attacks on major organizations, including national
governments, Interpol and Facebook. It has been extremely difficult to
pinpoint the origin of the attacks to either stop them or arrest the
actors. Ashley Fantz, Who Is Anonymous? Everyone and No One, CNN
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effects-based understanding to determine when cyberattack amounts
to a use of force under Article 2(4), stating “if a cyberattack would
have the same effects as certain governmentally initiated
coercive/harmful actions that are traditionally and generally not
treated as the ‘use of force’ (e.g., economic sanctions, espionage, or
certain covert actions), such a cyberattack should also not be
regarded as a use of force.” 143 Several factors—severity, immediacy,
directness, invasiveness, measurability, and presumptive legitimacy—
help define when an attack falls short of force. 144
For example, in 2007 Israel bombed an alleged North Korean
nuclear reactor located in Syria. 145 The bombing was undoubtedly a
use of force. Syria was unaware of the impending attack, because the
Israeli Air Force had tricked the defensive radar. 146 Israel used a spoof
attack to deceive Syrian air-defense radars, “first making it appear
that no jets were in the sky and then in an instant making the radar
believe the sky was filled with hundreds of planes.” 147 While the
bombing was certainly force, did the spoof attack, which facilitated
the bombing, amount to force? It seems unlikely, as the spoof attack
did not create kinetic damage. Had Syria noticed the CNA before the
bombing, any use of force as self-defense would have been a
disproportionate response, unless Syria could directly connect the
CNA to the traditional bombing that followed. 148
Feb. 9, 2012 http://articles.cnn.com/2012-02-09/world/world_anony
mous-explainer_1_chat-room-internet-caf-anonymous-members?_s=P
M:WORLD; see also Hilary Whiteman, Interpol Arrests Suspected
‘Anonymous’ Hackers, CNN (Feb. 29, 2012), http://articles.cnn.com/
2012-02-29/world/world_europe_anonymous-arrests-hacking_1_ddoshacking-group-denial-of-service-attacks?_s=PM:EUROPE; Doug Gross,
Hacker Group Vows to ‘Kill Facebook’, CNN (Aug. 9, 2011),
http://articles.cnn.com/2011-08-09/tech/anonymous.facebook_1_fa
cebook-ceo-mark-zuckerberg-denial-of-service-attacks-user?_s=PM:TE
CH.
143. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, TECHNOLOGY, POLICY, LAW, AND ETHICS
REGARDING U.S. ACQUISITION AND USE OF CYBERATTACK CAPABILITIES
34 (William A. Owens et al. eds., 2009).
144. See Schmitt, supra note 43, at 914–15 (listing the determinative factors
to distinguish armed force from other forms of coercion).
145. CLARKE & KNAKE, supra note 28, at 1–3.
146. See id. at 5.
147. Eli Lake, Israel’s Secret Iran Attack Plan: Electronic Warfare, THE
DAILY BEAST (Nov. 16, 2011, 6:28 PM), http://www.thedailybeast
.com/articles/2011/11/16/israel-s-secret-iran-attack-plan-electronicwarfare.print.html.
148. Additionally, different nations might have different views on what
constitutes force. See Waxman, supra note 48, at 46 (describing
developing nations’ preference for a more expansive view of force, not
limited to armed attack).
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If a state uses CNA to disrupt another state’s communication or
defense services prior to armed attack, the CNA alone would not give
the targeted state a right to respond with force. However, if the
targeted nation can persuasively link a CNA to impending armed
attack or demonstrate the CNA to be significant enough, it might
have grounds to claim the armed attack began in the computer
network, not on ground.

V. Cyberattacks as an Interference Tactic
Some operations cause inconvenience or interference with an
adversary’s operations, and thus fall short of “force” under the UN
Charter. 149 For example, a state might provide subversive propaganda
to foment rebellion among civilians of another state in order to
further its objectives. 150 With modern IO, a government can use social
networking or online news outlets to promote certain policies or
objectives among civilian populations abroad. 151 Modern technology
provides a more efficient means to achieve ends usually accomplished
via military action. 152 The ease of hiding behind the computer network
encourages the growth of clandestine activities. 153
149. See Michael N. Schmitt, War, Technology and the Law of Armed
Conflict, 82 INT’L L. STUD. 138, 156 (2006) [hereinafter Schmitt, War,
Technolgy and the Law of Armed Conflict] (“Mere inconvenience would
not [constitute armed attack].”).
150. Comment, The Use of Nonviolent Coercion: A Study in Legality Under
Article 2(4) of the Charter of the United States, 122 U. PA. L. REV. 983,
990 (1974) [hereinafter Nonviolent Coercion]. “[States] can occupy an
intermediate status between . . . extremes and seek to influence each
other by intermediate forms of coercion—that is, by nonamicable
measures short of war.” Id.
151. In a less covert example, Voice of America (VOA) radio and television
programming seeks to do exactly this. Currently, the United States
produces an Iranian version of Jon Stewart’s The Daily Show, called
Parazit, featuring two Iranian comedians mocking the current Iranian
regime and broadcasts the show into Iran on VOA. Although the
success of the program is difficult to measure, it is a direct line into
Iranian homes. SANGER, supra note 88, at 214–19. Computer networks
allow for similar spreading of information, but do so more covertly.
152. See Sean P. Kanuck, Information Warfare: New Challenges for Public
International Law, 37 HARV. INT’L L.J. 272, 284 (1996) (“[A]ttacking an
enemy’s information networks may go beyond incapacitating its armed
forces; it may serve as the best means of achieving victory.”). Here, the
drone analogy is not entirely appropriate as the use of drones falls is
squarely an armed attack. Cyberwar on the other hand offers much
greater opportunity for force short of armed attack so it is well worth an
analysis outside of the drone analogy.
153. See John Sifton, A Brief History of Drones, THE NATION (Feb. 27,
2012),
http://www.thenation.com/article/166124/brief-history-drones
(“Drones crossed into a new frontier in military affairs: an area of
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Currently, the United States operation of UAVs is growing not
just in the military branches, but also the CIA. 154 The justifications
for the greater role of the Executive Branch in overseas operations of
UAVs are instructive to the possible overseas use of computer
network attacks by the same. 155 The legality of the non-military use of
UAVs is still hotly debated. 156 Even with this uncertainty, the
explanation for the use of UAVs can shed light on a possible
justification for the use of covert CNA.
A.

Cyberwar as a Non-Covert Use of Force Not Amounting to Armed
Attack

Although non-intervention is one of the central tenants of
international law, this principle is flexible. 157 A state may use force,
without rising to the level of armed attack, and the targeted state will
not be legally permitted to respond with force. 158 Attempts at coercion
are a part of international geopolitics, to encourage compliance,
agreement, and acquiescence between states. 159 In such situations,
cyberwar finds a very appropriate role. Many cyberattacks are not
entirely risk-free, remote and even potentially automated killing
detached from human behavioral cues.”).
154. Id.
155. One of the frequent criticisms is of the Executive’s unilateral use of
UAVs through CIA covert actions. Congress has begun to stake out a
greater role for itself with greater oversight of the covert CIA UAV
program. Ken Dilanian, Congress Zooms in on Drone Killings, L.A.
TIMES, June 25, 2012, at 1.
156. See Blank & Farley, supra note 42, at 153 (disucssing whether the
United States is involved in legal self-defense responses or is engaging in
unlawful armed conflict).
157. See Jeffrey H. Smith, Keynote Address, 28 MICH. J. INT’L L. 543, 545
(2007).

Id.

One of the fundamental tenets of international law is, of course,
that one state not intervene in the internal affairs of another
state. It may be a fundamental principle, but it is also fairly
tattered. States seek to influence each other daily. Sometimes
this is done by economic sanctions, or by international political
pressure. Most of that activity is clearly legal, although the state
that is the target of the efforts almost always says that it is not.

158. See Brian T. O’Donnell & James C. Kraska, International Law of
Armed Conflict and Computer Network Attack: Developing the Rules of
Engagement, 76 INT’L L. STUD. 395, 398 (2002) (“Some scholars
maintain that a CNA constitutes a use of force, whereas other scholars
maintain that CNA is much more akin to adverse nonforceable
influence.”).
159. See generally Nonviolent Coercion, supra note 150 (discussing how and
when coercion may be used and in what forms it might take).
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armed attack, 160 and while invasive, merely amount to coercion or
interference and are therefore lawful.
There is a history of coercive actions by states and international
organizations to induce a change of behavior among states thought to
be in the wrong. For example, the UN Security Council is authorized
to place sanctions and other measures on states not in compliance
with the Charter. 161 The United Nations has used sanctions to
discourage development of weapons and weaken authoritarian
regimes. 162
Outside of multilateral actions, states engage in “low intensity
conflicts” both domestically and abroad as a manner of quashing
insurrection or other lawlessness. 163 Military or law enforcement may
conduct such operations. 164 The purpose of these actions is to improve
security while providing necessary aid in a localized manner. 165
Counterinsurgency
efforts
typify
this
type
of
action.
Counterinsurgency fighting is often localized and does not amount to
an armed attack. 166 These multi- and unilateral operations are
conducted with traditional tools of the military, but the new tools of
cyberspace should play a role.
Cyberspace will be a major center of low-intensity conflicts,
characterizing counterinsurgency efforts. “Operating below both the
focus of defensive schemes, as well as the legal threshold of States’
authority to respond with force, low-intensity cyberattacks may prove
160. See O’Donnell & Kraska, supra note 158, at 398–99 (discussing the
range of viable computer network attacks).
161. See U.N. Charter art. 39 (“The Security Council shall determine the
existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of
aggression and shall make recommendations, or decide what measures
shall be taken in accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or
restore international peace and security.”).
162. Sean D. Murphy, The Security Council, Legitimacy, and the Concept of
Collective Security After the Cold War, 32 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L.
201, 214–15 (1994).
163. Kenneth Watkin, Chemical Agents and “Expanding Bullets: Limited
Law Enforcement Exceptions or Unwarranted Handcuffs?, 82 INT’L L.
STUD. 193, 203 (2006) (noting militaries often acts within domestic
borders to assist in law enforcement or internal security efforts).
164. Id.
165. Id. at 204 (acknowledging that military forces can be used in both
international armed combat and in a domestic law enforcement
capacity).
166. See Samuel Liles, Cyberwarfare: As a Form of Low-Intensity Conflict
and Insurgency, CONFERENCE ON CYBER CONFLICT, PROCEEDINGS 2010,
47, 49 (2010) (observing that insurgency conflict has become central to
current national security interests and applying the counterinsurgency
legal framework to cyberwar).
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to be a future attack strategy of choice in cyberspace.” 167 A computer
attack can be force without amounting to armed attack and therefore
the targeted state may not respond with force. 168 Such low-intensity
attacks provide the benefits keeping the attacker anonymous and
protected, while “be[ing] effective to retard a target’s economic, social,
and technological development.” 169 The Stuxnet worm is a perfect
example. The worm effectively delayed Iranian development of
weapons-grade nuclear material, and Iran was unable to conclusively
identify the source of the attack or classify Stuxnet as armed
attack. 170
In comparing low-intensity attacks to counterinsurgency efforts, it
is important to balance political objectives and technical objectives.171
Both engagements require precision and very careful targeting;
valuing quality of impact over quantity. 172 The sophistication afforded
by such highly technical attacks helps to uphold international
humanitarian principles by avoiding indiscriminate destruction. 173
When using coercion or interference, a state must be sure not to
take the action too far. In one of the most tragic examples of
sanctions, the United Nations imposed sanctions on Iraq designed to
stop Iraq’s development of nuclear weapons. 174 These sanctions made

167. Sean Watts, Self-Defense and Computer Network Attack, 87 INT’L L.
STUD. 59, 60 (2011). Watts also notes the risk of this tactic. He warns
that gaps in the law might leave states with little choice if such attack
is used, because they will not have the right to self-defense, since the
action will fall short of force. Also, it opens up the universe of possible
actors to non-state actors. Id. at 61.
168. Id. at 67 (“Only armed attack frees a state from the prohibition on the
use of force.”).
169. Id. at 73.
170. Nakashima, Miller & Tate, supra note 9. In fact the Obama
Administration was seeking to do exactly this—interfere with Iran’s
nuclear enrichment program without using armed attack. “The idea was
not only to slow Iran’s ability to produce enriched uranium; it was to
mess with iran’s best scientific and military minds.” SANGER, supra note
88, at 199.
171. Liles, supra note 166, at 53(noting elements such as population,
adversary, and terrain have different effects on the political and
technical objectives).
172. See id. (observing the difficulty in achieving a meaningful attack that
would target a large number of computers).
173. This is also one of the arguments promoted for the use of UAV attacks,
as the UAVS are much more accurate than traditional bombs or
missiles. See supra notes 38 and 118 and accompanying text.
174. S.C. Res. 661, U.N. Doc. S/RES/661 (Aug. 6, 1990).
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exceptions for humanitarian aid, including medicine and food.175
However, due to complicated issues and the lengthy duration of the
administration of the sanctions regime, there was “shocking and
extreme harm” among the civilian population. 176
Cyberweapons can create a similar disaster. A simple error in
computer code can destroy vital public services for an entire state,
putting public safety and welfare at risk. 177 In addition, specific
context is very important. When Estonia was attacked, its near
complete reliance on the internet for daily services ensured significant
damage and impact on every citizen. 178 Such an attack on a less wired
state might specifically target a despotic oligarchy and thus might be
a viable objective. 179 In a less wired state, an attack would only reach
the upper levels of a government that can afford highly connected
computer networks and leave the innocent civilians who do not rely
on computer networks unharmed. While the advantages of lowintensity attacks are great, the risks must not be ignored and each
situation must be evaluated carefully on its own facts. 180
175. Id.; see also Joy Gordon, When Intent Makes All the Difference in the
World: Economic Sanctions on Iraq and the Accusation of Genocide, 5
YALE HUM. RTS. & DEV. L.J. 57, 71 (2002) (describing how sanctions
affected humanitarian aid in Iraq).
176. See Gordon, supra note 175, at 71 (“The result has been large-scale and
long-term damage to every aspect of life in Iraq—for all except the very
wealthy, and the political and military elite—with severe damage to
education, health care, and employment . . . .”). Estimates of death
tolls, disease rates, and infrastructure damage varied. A UN coordinator
of humanitarian aid in Iraq during sanctions resigned and became an
outspoken critic against the sanctions, due to the massive suffering
caused. See Michael Powell, The Deaths He Cannot Sanction, WASH.
POST (Dec. 17, 1998), http://www.public.asu.edu/~wellsda/foreignpolicy
/Halliday-criticizes-sanctions.html. This was a very complicated
international problem that has been the focus a great deal of news
coverage and legal scholarship, which is outside the scope of this Note.
177. A lesser version of this happened with Stuxnet. Stuxnet was not
supposed to “enter the wild” but stay confined to the Iranian
enrichment facilities. Nonetheless, the worm escaped, exposing
unintended targets and the covert operation. SANGER, supra note 88, at
206–05.
178. Davis, supra note 15.
179. See Sean Watts, Low Intensity Computer Network Attack and SelfDefense, 87 INT’L L. STUD. 59, 73 (2011) (“Low-visibility, low-intensity
CNA may be effective to retard a target’s economic, social and
technological development.”).
180. Id. 77–78 (“CNA render geography largely meaningless. States
previously insulated from armed attack by distance or terrain enjoy no
such benefits in cyberspace. Borders and neighbors do not determine
one’s cyber security. Rather, in an ironic sense, susceptibility to attack
may be a function of the extent to which a State relies on the very
information technology that is targeted.”).
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B.

Cyberwar in Covert Operations

In the United States, the military and CIA operate UAVs. 181 The
CIA operates under “title 50” authority. 182 Title 50, the National
Security Act, defines covert action as, “an activity or activities of the
United States Government to influence political, economic, or military
conditions abroad, where it is intended that the role of the United
States Government will not be apparent or acknowledged publicly . . .
.” 183 The United States further authorizes covert actions under
Executive Order 12,333, which makes covert actions the exclusive
domain of the CIA. 184
Like espionage and coercive actions, some covert actions are
probably legal under international law. 185 However, international law
restrains covert actions as it does overt actions, based on principles of
sovereignty, proportionality and discrimination. 186 Covert actions
particularly challenge the principle of attribution. 187 By definition a
covert action should be non-attributable. Whether the covert action is

181. See Peter W. Singer, Op-Ed, Do Drones Undermine Democracy?, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 21, 2012, at SR5. Singer provides an overview of war powers
and the authority of the Executive versus Congress in times of war.
Singer is somewhat skeptical of some of the covert UAV strikes operated
by the CIA, but not of the technology generally. Id.
182. 50 U.S.C. § 403 (2006).
183. 50 U.S.C. § 413(b) (2006). Intelligence gathering and surveillance is not
considered a covert action. Id.
184. Exec. Order 12,333, 3 C.F.R. 206 (1982) (“[T]he CIA shall . . . [c]onduct
special activities approved by the President. No agency except the CIA .
. . may conduct any special activity unless the President determines
that another agency is more likely to achieve a particular objective.”);
see also Robert D. Williams, (Spy) Game Change: Cyber Networks,
Intelligence Collection, and Covert Action, 79 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1162,
1169–70 (2011) (finding the E.O. 12,333 to provide the CIA with covert
authority and that it was subsequently codified in the Intelligence
Authorization Act).
185. See Smith, supra note 157, at 545 (“So, if espionage activities—that is
to say the collection of intelligence—are consistent with, or at least
tolerated by, international law, what activities are prohibited?”).
186. See Dieter Fleck, Individual and State Responsibility for Intelligence
Gathering, 28 MICH. J. INT’L L. 687, 693 (2007). The logical extension of
this responsibility is that no covert action could possibly be legal in
international law. Id. This is a highly debated point of international law,
and this Note assumes that in at least some cases covert actions are
legal in arguendo.
187. See id. at 695 (stating that covert actions are often not attributable to
the state because they are carried out by private actors).
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to influence political discourse or bomb a target without detection,
the goal of any action is to avoid detection.188
The CIA’s UAV campaign in Pakistan is covert force. These
strikes are attributable to the United States based on circumstantial
evidence, not traditional means such as state admission of
responsibility. 189 The CIA and Obama Administration (to the extent
either admits to conducting the strikes) justify these strikes under
similar laws as the military justification for UAV use prior to
combat. 190
The United States also justifies CIA UAVs based on selfdefense. 191 At a public speech at the American Society of International
Law, the Legal Adviser to the Department of State Harold Koh said,
“it is the considered view of [the Obama] Administration . . . that
U.S. targeting practices, including lethal operations conducted with
the use of unmanned aerial vehicles, comply with all applicable law,
including the laws of war.” 192 Mr. Koh explained that the use of UAVs
is acceptable both as acts of self-defense and under the Authorization
for the Use of Military Force Congress passed after 9/11. 193 These
operations are also conducted under the authority of Executive Order
12,333. 194 The United States contextualizes the UAV actions as part
188. For example, during the Cold War, the United States used covert
actions to combat Russian power. In Italy, the CIA used a covert
political organizing program to prevent the Russian Communist party
from gaining traction internationally. A. John Radsan, An Overt Turn
on Covert Action, 53 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 485, 492 (2009). These efforts
were made with Italian cooperation. Id. at 493. Other campaigns have
involved more violent and direct influence, including overthrowing
regimes in Iran and Nicaragua. Id. at 500. Such actions and direct
involvement are more heavily debated and likely less in favor, especially
among the international community. Id. at 501.
189. See Julian E. Barnes, Panetta Makes Crack About Not-So-Secret CIA
Drone Program, WALL ST. J., WASHINGTON WIRE (Oct. 7, 2011, 12:32
PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/washwire/2011/10/07/panetta-makes-cracksabout-not-so-secret-cia-drone-program/. Although, the covert UAV
program is probably one of the “worst kept secrets,” jokes former CIA
director and now Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta. Id.
190. See A. John Radsan & Richard Murphy, Measure Twice, Shoot Once:
Higher Care for CIA-Targeted Killing, 2011 U. ILL. L. REV. 1201, 1229
(2011).
191. Harold Koh, Dep’t of State Legal Adviser, Keynote Address: The
Obama Administration and International Law, in 104 AM. SOC’Y INT’L
L. PROC. 207, 219–20 (2010).
192. Id. at 218.
193. Id. at 218–19.
194. Exec. Order 12,333, 3 C.F.R. 206 (1982); see also A. John Radsan, An
Overt Turn on Covert Action, 53 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 485, 528 (2009)
(describing the special authority under E.O. 12,333, including that the
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of an armed conflict with belligerent terrorist organizations, justifying
the use of force as self-defense. 195
Like the UAV program, the United States can conduct CNA
without taking credit. The United States might use a firewall to keep
out undesirable information or infiltrate a network to provide
favorable information to civilians in a targeted state. 196 Such actions
might violate the laws of neutrality by inserting the United States
into conflicts or situations it otherwise has no immediate stake in.197
Computer networks offer much more nuanced forms of influence than
UAVs.
UAVs present the same challenge when entering a state. The
United States is not engaged in a conflict by traditional definition,
but the United States still views the UAV campaigns to be legal. 198 As
long as a covert cyberattack conforms to the rigors of international
humanitarian principles, the United States can justify such actions.
When covert cyber actions distinguish between civilians and military
and do not cause unnecessary suffering, they can be justified in the
same manner as traditional covert tools. 199 Recourse by targeted
states against these actions should be classified by the covert nature
of the attack, not the cyber methods.

VI. Conclusion
Technology is advancing faster than ever and states around the
world have taken notice. 200 When any new technology emerges, many
may rush to seek a new regulation scheme. But the “evolutionary
flexibility” of the laws of armed conflict is specifically designed to
White House can pick who needs to be part of a decision to operate
under this authority and that E.O. 12,333 are not necessarily
intelligence operations requiring CIA participation).
195. See Raul A. “Pete” Pedrozo, Use of Unmanned Systems to Combat
Terrorism, 87 INT’L L. STUD. 217, 228 (2011) (remarking that arguments
against the use of UAVs “incorrectly assume that the United States is
not engaged in an armed conflict with al-Qaeda and that the targeted
terrorist groups do not pose an imminent and continuing threat to the
United States . . . .”).
196. Walker, supra note 107, at 239.
197. Id.
198. Koh, supra note 191, at 219–20.
199. See Schmitt, War, Technolgy and the Law of Armed Conflict, supra
note 149, at 138 (discussing the cardinal principles of international
conflict, distinction and prevention of unnecessary suffering, as set forth
by the International Court of Justice and the relevant application of the
principles to emerging technologies).
200. See id. at 137 (“In the 21st century, the pace of technological change in
warfare has quickened.”).

543

CaseWestern Reserve Journal of International Law·Vol. 45·2012
Cyberwar and Unmanned Aerial Vehicles

allow for developments in technology. 201 These laws exist for the
protection of civilians during conflict—a goal and mission that does
not change with the methods of warfare employed. 202
A rush to impose new legal obligations just because the
technology is new is counterproductive. 203 The principles of
humanitarian protection remain immutable and the laws of war
continue to protect, despite advancing technologies. New technologies
present new opportunities to meet the pressing asymmetric challenges
of modern warfare. 204 The specter of cyberwar looms large. Yet with
exploration of the technology and law, cyberwar does not need to
strike fear into the hearts of average citizens. As with centuries of
conflict, from the battering ram to the warship to computer network
attack, the modern laws of war will serve as a practical framework for
national security.

201. Darren M. Stewart, New Technology and the Law of Armed Conflict, 87
INT’L L. STUD. 271, 272 (2011).
202. See id. (describing the flexibility of the law of armed conflict in meeting
new warfare technology).
203. Compare Brooks, supra note 20 (discussing the changing methods of
modern warfare and how the traditional laws of armed conflict apply,
but perhaps with new meaning), Johnson, supra note 21 (cataloging the
calls for a new treaty on information warfare by statesmen that are
inconsistent with those who work in the field, arguing that a new treaty
would be ineffective), Dinstein, supra note 21 (observing that there are
always calls for new laws with new technology, but that these are rarely
needed), Schmitt, supra note 43 (pointing out new weapons are not as
different from their predecessors as many suppose), Dörmann, supra
note 132 (applying the traditional laws of war to cyberwar), and Doyle,
supra note 135 (suggesting the traditional laws of war are instructive
with regard to how a nation might respond to a computer network
attack), with CLARKE & KNAKE, supra note 28 (ultimately calling for a
new system of internet and national security governance), Mary Ellen
O’Connell, Unlawful Killing with Combat Drones: A Case Study of
Pakistan 2004–2009, in SHOOTING TO KILL: SOCIO-LEGAL PERSPECTIVES
ON THE USE OF LETHAL FORCE (2012) (suggesting that current laws are
inadequate to govern drones), and Davis Brown, A Proposal for an
International Convention To Regulate the Use of Information Systems
in Armed Conflict, 47 HARV. INT’L L. J. 179 (2006) (describing a
possible treaty solution to govern computer systems used during war).
204. Wolff Heintschel von Heinegg, Asymmetric Warfare: How to Respond?,
87 INT’L L. STUD. 463, 463 (2011).
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